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Abstract
Eckhard Janeba (Dec 2000 “Tax Competition when Governments lack Commitment” American
Economic Review 90, 1508-19) has recently suggested a novel approach to modelling the
relationship between governments and multinational firms. As part of ongoing research into
various aspects of multijurisdictional tax competition, this paper investigates the possibility of
allowing for collusion between governments when setting tax rates in the model. The findings
show that a self-enforcing agreement is possible, with the beneficial effect of cutting the firm’s
excess profits, limiting investment in excess capacity, and raising government revenue.
                                                
* This paper was completed as part of ongoing research programme funded by an ESRC grant: “Multijurisdictional
Economies; Trade and Tax/Amenity Competition,” with Principal Investigator, Myrna Wooders. I would like to
thank Myrna Wooders for suggesting this topic and for comments and support in the writing of this paper. I am also
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21. Introduction
In his two recent papers (AER, 2000 and IER, forthcoming), Janeba has made an important
contribution toward understanding the relationship between multinational firms and
governments. Within a single framework, his model captures the conflicting literature regarding
tax competition and lack of government commitment, while showing how these features may
encourage firms to make capacity investment in more than one country. A novel explanation is
thus presented for the increasing prevalence of multinational firms.
This essay studies the effect of allowing for collusion between governments when setting
tax rates, in the same vein as work by Kehoe (1989). Contrary to the conclusions drawn from his
model, I show that collusion is a beneficial strategy, cutting the firm’s excess profits, limiting
investment in excess capacity, and raising government revenue. Dhillon et al (1999) have
suggested that rules are inadequate to deal with tax competition, but in this model a simple
contract is shown to be sufficient.
The paper shows that a self-enforcing contract between governments is possible in
Janeba’s model, but the nature of this agreement will depend on whether or not the firm initially
holds maximum capacity in the two countries. More specifically, a contract whereby both
governments set their tax rates to unity is self-enforcing only when the firm holds maximum
capacity in both countries. If the firm holds a lower capacity in the two countries, it is necessary
to consider a different type of contract whereby the governments alternate between setting their
tax rate equal to 1 and (1-ε), just less than unity, for the agreement to be self-enforcing.
Finally, I consider the implications for firm capacity. Assuming the firm’s initial capacity
is below the maximum, I show that knowledge of the onset of a collusive agreement results in an
optimal strategy for the firm of leaving capacity unchanged.
2. The Model
The model investigates the behaviour of a single firm selling a homogenous good q, which may
be produced in either of two countries.  In order to produce the good in country i, the firm must
invest in capacity, q i , for which there is a cost, C( q i). The government in country i taxes any
output at a rate  ti .
For simplicity, it is assumed that total demand for the good and the reservation price are
both unity.  The firm maximises profits net of tax and the governments maximise their tax
revenues.  The firm must choose capacities  ( q 1 ,  q 2)  before the governments commit to their
tax rates  (t1 , t2).  Finally, the firm choose outputs  (q1 , q2)  with  t1  and  t2  fixed.  Janeba
proceeds to solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium in this one-period game.
If the firm chooses to enter the market, he concludes, it will always hold equal capacity in
both countries with 1 < 2qq 21 ≤+ .  The optimal plant size will depend on the trade off between
tax rates and the cost of investment.  The cost function is assumed to have the properties C q ( q )
> 0 and C qq ( q ) ≥0.  When  2qq 21 =+ , the tax rate will be competed down to zero.  Otherwise,
the governments randomise over tax rates, with government i earning expected revenue of
( )q1 j− .
Janeba then briefly discusses the welfare effects of varying capacity cost before
investigating a dynamic version of the model, the one-period game being played repeatedly over
3an infinite horizon.  He concludes that the firm’s best strategy in this situation is to invest in
maximum capacity in both countries immediately rather than building up capacity slowly in one
country.
3. Collusion Between Governments
The modification to Janeba’s model that I investigate is the possibility of collusion between
governments.  Collusion can only be considered in the dynamic form of the model, as any
agreement would not be credible in the single-shot game.
Now, Janeba has shown that in his basic dynamic model a firm will always choose to set
up maximum capacity in both countries immediately, rather than slowly building capacity in just
one country.  Competition between governments then lowers the tax rate to zero.  Each
government would therefore strictly prefer any agreement yielding positive revenue to this zero-
revenue situation.
Suppose, therefore, that the firm has already set up maximum capacity in both countries1.
At a later date, the governments both agree to set their tax rates equal to unity.  According to the
rules of the model, the firm would produce =
+ )qq(
q
21
i ½ in each country and each government
would collect revenue equal to this output in every period.
If the agreement is to hold, however, neither host government must have an incentive to
deviate.  If country  i  deviates in period  τ ,  setting its tax rate )1(ti ε−= ,  just less than unity
2,
the firm would switch its entire production to country  i  and the government would receive
revenue of  (1 - ε ).  In order to deter such a deviation the government of country j can threaten
to lower its tax rate to zero in this situation.  The threat is credible because the firm will not
produce in country  j  as long as  tj > t i  .  A deviation by government i would therefore only yield
one period of inflated revenue before revenue falls to zero in each successive period.
The incentive constraint for government i in every period τ is thus,
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As  ε   is very small, this can be approximated as  ≥δ ½ .  The discount factor would therefore
have to be extremely high (i.e. δ  must be low) in order to make deviation from the agreement
worthwhile.  We can reasonably conclude that this collusion contract will be self-enforcing.
Given the possibility of collusion between governments, however, it is not still certain
that the firm will choose to invest in maximum capacity in both countries.  Would the
governments still be able to agree a self-enforcing contract if ½ 1q << ?
                                                
1 We do not, therefore, need to address the firm participation constraint in the following analysis of collusion
contracts because it is assumed that the firm has already recouped the investment costs.
2 More specifically, ε is a ‘small number’ such that when multiplied by q  yields the smallest currency unit.
4In fact, it can be shown that such a contract is possible, but it must take on a different
form to the agreement I have so far considered (which I shall now refer to as ‘contract 1’).  Let
us first investigate the incentive constraints for this agreement under the new capacity levels.
The payoff from contract 1 is unchanged, with government i receiving revenue of  ½  in
each period.  Without any agreement, government i would randomise its tax rate, receiving
expected revenue of )q1( j−  in each period (see equation (7) in Janeba).  Now consider the
situation in which government i enters into contract 1, but then deviates from its agreement in
period τ, setting its tax rate equal to iq)1( ε−  in period τ, while government j receives revenue
of )q1( i− .  In order to deter such a deviation, government j can threaten to punish i by returning
to its previous strategy of randomising tax rates from period τ + 1 onward. This threat is credible
if the government is risk-neutral, as the expected revenue from this strategy is equal to what it
receives if tj is left equal to unity.
The incentive constraint for government i is therefore,
τ
iDj
2
ji
2τ
ic R...)q(1δ)qδ(1ε)(1q...)2
1(δ)
2
1δ(
2
1R =+−+−+−≥+++=
 ε)(1qq
ε][(1/2)-qδ
ji
i
+−+
+
≤
As 0ε→  this can be written as: 
1qq
(1/2)-qδ
ji
i
−+
≤
As ji qq = , this expression reduces to 1/2δ ≤ . In order for the contract to be self-enforcing,
therefore, the discount rate would have to be very high. We can thus conclude that contract 1 will
not generally be self-enforcing when 1q1/2 << .
Now consider a slightly different collusion agreement, ‘contract 2’, in which the two
governments alternate between setting the tax rate equal to 1 and (1-ε) respectively. With ti=1
and tj=(1-ε), the firm would wish to produce at maximum capacity in country j. Government I
would then get revenue of )q1( j−  and government j would receive revenue of jqε)(1− . The tax
rates and revenue situations would then be reversed in the following period.
Let us examine government i’s incentive constraint for contract 2 in each period τ.
Assuming i sets t=1 in the first period3 and noting qqq ji == ,
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The payoff from deviating from the agreement is calculated by assuming government i lowers its
tax rate slightly below government j in period τ. Government j is then punishes i by returning to
its old strategy of randomising tj in following periods.  The threat is credible if j is risk-neutral as
the expected payoff from randomising its tax rate would exceed that of keeping tj = (1 -ε).
Rearranging the constraint,
                                                
3 Government i would clearly not gain from any deviation in a period when its agreed tax rate is already less than tj.
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Assuming   0 < δ < 1 ,
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We can reasonably expect δ  to satisfy this constraint, so we can conclude that the contract will
generally be self-enforcing.
Finally, it is worth noting that contract 2 would not be chosen over contract 1 when the
firm’s capacity is unity in both countries, although it would still be a self-enforcing agreement,
given the assumption 62.0≥δ .  This can be seen by examining the incentive constraint for
contract 2, noting that revenue is zero for government i when ti > tj:
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Again, note that government i would clearly not gain from any deviation in a period where it’s
agreed tax rate is less than tj, so this case is not considered.
The reason why contract 2 will not be chosen over contract 1 when q  = 1 is because the
total discounted payoff to government i in period T, the first period in which the contract takes
effect, will depend on whether i is the first to set its tax rate at the lower level, ε−1( ) , or the
higher level, unity.  Suppose government 1 sets T1t = (1 - ε ) and government 2 sets 
T
2t = 1.
Comparing the payoffs from contract 1, RT1, and contract 2, RT2, for government 1 (and
assuming 0→ε ),
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The only solution to this is 1=δ , which by assumption is not possible.  So government 1 must
prefer contract 2 over contract 1.
Now compare the payoffs to government 2:
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This constraint holds for ≤δ 1, so government 2 must always prefer contract 1 over contract 2.
6Instead of having to decide which government receives the larger payoff, it would be
preferable to split the total benefits equally.  Consider the total revenue received by both
governments under contract 2 in every period τ:
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Now consider the total revenue generated by contract 1 in every period τ :
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The two contracts therefore generate the same total revenue, but contract 1 splits this revenue
evenly between the two governments.  In fact, the total revenue generated by contract 1 will be
marginally higher than from contract 2, by a small factor ε  in every period.  For these two
reasons, we know that the governments will prefer setting their tax rates equal to unity when
q  = 1 in both countries, under a collusion agreement.
As Janeba’s paper is principally concerned with the determination of firm capacity, it is
worth making a short remark on the implications of the introduction of government collusion
into the model.
Assume the firm has initial capacity ½ < 1τq −  < 1 in each country.  What is the firm’s
best strategy in period τ onward, given the knowledge that some form of collusion agreement
between the two governments will be in effect?
The answer is that the firm should leave capacity unchanged, yielding a small positive
profit qε  in every period.  Although qε  is assumed strictly positive (otherwise contract 2 would
fail to operate), it can be assumed that 0q →δε .  The firm maximises its profit by considering
possible investment, I, in period τ alone4: C(I)I)qε(Πτ −+= . We may reasonably assume C(I) >
ε I  so, qεC(I)I)qε(Πτ <−+= .
The firm will thus maximise its profits by leaving capacity unchanged.
4. Conclusions
This paper has shown how it is possible for the governments in Janeba’s model to create self-
enforcing agreements yielding positive revenue to each. This modification also has the beneficial
side effect of rendering unprofitable any further investment by the firm in excess capacity.
Of course, the basic model is a somewhat simplified version of reality. For example, it so
far omits the possibility of differences between countries and the additional risk of exchange rate
volatility. On the other hand, the conclusions may be applicable to the relatively homogenous
selection of countries within the Euro-zone. This paper’s analysis could then be seen as offering
further support for the greater harmonisation of fiscal policy in the area.
                                                
4 Note I assume the entire investment takes place in the country with the lower tax rate in period τ.
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